Global chip supply ensurement during the short period
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the global chip supply chain. Shortage of electronic components was first noticed in car factories, and then in the entire electronics industry. The US, Taiwan and China are the largest markets for semiconductor manufacturers, which are no longer able to meet the everincreasing demand for chips. Lack of production capacity is mostly felt by consumers of final products. Ensuring a steady supply of chips is an important task for major manufacturers. In order to ensure the supply of chips, it is important to establish criteria by which semiconductor manufacturing countries can be arranged. The ranking will help identify the countries that are worth investing the most in the short term. The European Union, the United States and major telecommunications companies will invest billions of dollars in 2022 to replenish the market. The article analyzes the criteria for investing in chipproducing countries. The main focus of this analysis is the chip supply chain. Each of the analyzed countries has at least one stage of chip production: design, manufacturing or assembly. Data analyzed: gross domestic product, net exports, price of one dollar in relation to the national currency, monthly average wages, Oxford COVID-19 government response severity index and semiconductor export volume. These criteria allow us to rank countries from the most attractive to the least attractive for investment. The TOPSIS method was chosen for ranking, but comparative data analysis and analysis of scientific literature and other sources of information were also applied. Method principle, formulas and application – to be described. It was determined which country is the most favorable for short-term investments, taking into account the given criteria.
Article in Lithuanian.
Lustų tiekimo užtikrinimas trumpuoju laikotarpiu
Santrauka
COVID-19 pandemija sutrikdė pasaulinę lustų tiekimo grandinę. Elektronikos komponentų trūkumas pirma pastebėtas automobilių gamyklose, o paskui ir visoje elektronikos pramonėje. JAV, Taivanas ir Kinija – didžiausios puslaidininkių gamintojų rinkos, nebesuspėjančios patenkinti nuolatos didėjančio lustų poreikio. Gamybinių pajėgumų trūkumas labiausiai jaučiamas galutinių produktų vartotojams. Užtikrinti pastovų lustų tiekimą yra svarbi užduotis didiesiems gamintojams. Tam, kad lustų tiekimas būtų užtikrintas, svarbu nustatyti kriterijus, pagal kuriuos būtų galima suranguoti puslaidininkius gaminančias šalis. Rangavimas padės nustatyti šalis, į kurias labiausiai verta investuoti trumpuoju laikotarpiu. Europos Sąjunga, JAV ir didžiosios telekomunikacijų bendrovės 2022 metais investuos milijardus dolerių, kad rinka būtų papildyta. Straipsnyje analizuojama, kokiais kriterijais remiantis galima investuoti į lustus gaminančias šalis. Pagrindinis šios analizės objektas – lustų tiekimo grandinė. Kiekvienoje iš analizuojamų šalių vyksta bent vienas lustų gamybos etapas: projektavimas, gamyba arba surinkimas. Analizuojami duomenys: bendrasis vidaus produktas, grynasis eksportas, vieno dolerio kaina nacionalinės valiutos atžvilgiu, mėnesinis vidutinis darbo užmokestis, Oksfordo COVID-19 vyriausybės atsako griežtumo indeksas ir puslaidininkių eksporto dydis. Šie kriterijai leidžia suranguoti valstybes nuo labiausiai patrauklios investuoti iki mažiausiai. Ranguoti pasirinktas TOPSIS metodas, tačiau taikyta ir lyginamoji duomenų analizė bei mokslinės literatūros ir kitų informacijos šaltinių analizė. Metodo principas, formulės ir taikymas – aprašyti. Nustatyta, kurioje šalyje trumpalaikės investicijos yra palankiausios, atsižvelgiant į pateiktus kriterijus.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: lustų tiekimas, trumpalaikės investicijos, lustus gaminančios šalys, puslaidininkių pramonė, COVID-19 pandemija.
Keyword : chip supply, short-term investment, chip-producing countries, semiconductor industry, COVID-19 pandemic
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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